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Google, Charlottesville, and the Need
to Protect Private Employees’ Political
Speech
INTRODUCTION
Consider that you are the owner of a popular hot dog
eatery in Berkeley, California. One day in early August, after a
long day of sausage sales, you return home and turn on the news,
only to see the face of one of your employees participating in a
white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.1 The next
day, a popular Twitter account releases a photo of your
employee, mentioning your restaurant, and calling on you to
terminate the employee. You find yourself in a tough position.
On one hand, you are in charge of a private entity (the hot dog
restaurant), with a reputation and legitimate business interests
that could suffer due to your continued employment of a known
neo-Nazi. On the other hand, you are a steadfast supporter of
free speech, and have serious doubts about allowing a Twitter
account to dictate your employee’s right to assert his or her
sociopolitical views off the clock, while maintaining a job. After
all, you know that if you were a government agency, firing this
employee would probably be a violation of his or her First
Amendment rights.2 So what are private employers to do?
1 This hypothetical is inspired by the effects of a Twitter account that became
widely known for tweeting photos of people who attended the “Unite the Right” rally or
Charlottesville rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. The Twitter account ultimately gained
traction and led to the firing or resignation (this context is disputed) of a rally attendee
named Cole White from Top Dog Restaurant in Berkeley, California. See James
Wilkinson & Hannah Parry, White Nationalist is ‘Fired from his Job’ as Twitter Names
and Shames Far-Right Thugs at ‘Unite the Right’ Charlottesville Rally that Led to
Protester’s Death, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 14, 2017, 2:21 AM EDT), http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4786826/Nationalist-FIRED-Twitter-names-shamesprotesters.html [https://perma.cc/MH2K-VYRZ]; Veronica Rocha, Cole White, Man
Photographed at White Supremacist Rally, Is Out of a Job at Berkeley Hot Dog Eatery,
L. A. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017, 3:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-colewhite-berkeley-top-dog-job-20170814-story.html [https://perma.cc/3A2K-3AAA]; @Yes
YoureRacist, TWITTER (Aug. 12, 2017, 1:28 PM), https://twitter.com/YesYoureRacist/
status/896423173914230784 [https://perma.cc/3ZYX-BBZB]; see also infra Section III.B.
2 Steven J. Mulroy & Amy H. Moorman, Raising the Floor of Company
Conduct: Deriving Public Policy from the Constitution in an Employment-at-Will Arena,
41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 945, 945 (2014); see also Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S.
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The First Amendment’s free speech provision applies only
against government employers, and not against nongovernmental,
or private, employers.3 While the Supreme Court has laid out the
limits to political free speech for government employees,4 there is
no such federal standard for the political speech of private
employees.5 The actions taken by private employers are still subject
to certain federal statutes, namely bans on discrimination based on
race, sex, national origin, and others.6 In this regard, the federal
government prohibits private employers from firing or retaliating
against employees based on their membership in certain protected
classes.7 Federal law does not, however, ban private employers
from discriminating against employees on the basis of their
political affiliation.8 Instead, the risk of private employees being
fired or retaliated against based on their political views or activities
is dependent on the statutory or common law of the state in which
they are employed.9
A substantial minority of states have statutes that
generally protect private employees from discrimination based
on their political views.10 These prohibitive statutes vary greatly
in language and application. For example, in California,
employers are banned from discriminating based on “political
activity,” which includes “ideological advocacy generally and not
just election-related [activities].”11 This statute is similar to ones
enacted in other states, including in West Virginia and South
62, 75 (1990) (holding that “[p]romotions, transfers, and recalls . . . based on political
affiliation or support are an impermissible infringement on the First Amendment rights
of public employees”).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I; Eugene Volokh, Can Private Employers Fire
Employees for Going to a White Supremacist Rally?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
OPINION (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2017/08/16/can-private-employers-fire-employees-for-going-to-a-white-supremacistrally/?utm_term=.a33081c522f9 [https://perma.cc/EW59-9ENH] [hereinafter Volokh,
White Supremacist Rally].
4 See, e.g. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 62; see also Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517–
19 (1980) (holding that public employment cannot be conditioned on an employee’s
political beliefs, except in certain circumstances where the “private political beliefs would
interfere with the discharge of [the employee’s] public duties”).
5 Volokh, White Supremacist Rally, supra note 3.
6 Id.; see also e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
78 Stat. 241,(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012)); Equal Pay Act
of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012))).
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
8 Volokh, White Supremacist Rally, supra note 3.
9 See Mark T. Carroll, Note, Protecting Private Employees’ Freedom of Political
Speech, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35, 41 (1981); see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101 (West 2018).
10 Eugene Volokh, Private Employee’s Speech and Political Activity: Statutory
Protection against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 295, 297 (2012) [hereinafter
Volokh, Statutory Protections]; see also Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 986.
11 Volokh, White Supremacist Rally, supra note 3; see also CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1101 (West 2018).
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Carolina.12 In New York, on the other hand, employers are banned
from firing employees based on “recreational activities” as well as
“political activities.”13 Although most employment within the
United States is “at-will,”14 statutes such as the ones in California,
West Virginia, South Carolina, New York, as well as other states,
have been put in place to prevent private employees from being
fired based on political activity.15
These state statutes are especially relevant in recent times,
as political and ideological activities are increasingly public.16 In
the aftermath of the white nationalist march in Charlottesville,
Virginia, civil rights advocates have taken to social media to spread
photos and information about rally participants.17 In some cases,
social media posts about participants’ information and employers
have been revealed, leading to white nationalists being fired from
their places of employment.18 When answering the question, “[c]an
private employers fire employees for going to a white supremacist
rally?”, Eugene Volokh of the Volokh Conspiracy says that it
“depend[s] on the state [in which] the employee is employed.”19
This issue is also exemplified in the recent situation
where Google fired a male software engineer, James Damore,
12 See Volokh, White Supremacist Rally, supra note 3; see also W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 3-8-11(b) (West 2018) (enacted 1915) (making it a misdemeanor for any employer
or agent of an employer to “give any notice or information to his employees, containing
any threat, either express or implied, intended or calculated to influence the political
view[s] or actions of the . . . employees”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-560 (2011) (enacted
1950) (making it “unlawful for a person to . . . discharge a citizen from
employment . . . because of political opinions or the exercise of political rights and
privileges guaranteed to every citizen by the Constitution and laws of the United States
or by the Constitution and laws of this State”).
13 Volokh, White Supremacist Rally, supra note 3; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d
(McKinney 2018) (enacted 1992) (defining “recreational activities” as “any lawful, leisuretime activity, for which the employee receives no compensation and which is generally
engaged in for recreational purposes, including but not limited to sports, games, hobbies,
exercise, reading and the viewing of television, movies and similar material”).
14 Matthew T. Bodie, The Best Way Out Is Always Through: Changing the
Employment At-Will Default Rule to Protect Personal Autonomy, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV.
223, 224–28 (2017) (“The at-will rule creates a presumption that the employee can be
terminated without cause—or, as many courts have framed it, ‘for any reason, or no
reason at all.’”(footnote omitted)); see also Section I.A.
15 Volokh, White Supremacist Rally, supra note 3.
16 See Bodie, supra note 14, at 266.
17 Stacey Rose Harris & Noor Chughtai, Impact of the Charlottesville Protests
on Virginia Employers, 29 No. 8 VA. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2017).
18 See Aaron Aupperlee, Western Pa. Company Fires Man Who Attended
Charlottesville Rally, TRIB LIVE (Aug. 28, 2017, 5:33 PM), http://triblive.com/local/
allegheny/12670026-74/western-pa-company-fires-man-who-attended-charlottesvillerally [https://perma.cc/L32A-SE44].
19 Volokh, White Supremacist Rally, supra note 3. The Volokh Conspiracy is a
part of the Washington Post, and is a blog written by law professors and legal scholars on
various issues of law and public policy. Eugene Volokh, Editorial Independence, WASH.
POST:VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/about/?utm_term=.7fd542199463 [https://perma.cc/929W-Q7HM].
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who posted a memo challenging some of Google’s diversity
efforts, “such as mentoring programs open only to people of a
certain race or gender.”20 The memo contained provocative
statements about differences between men and women, citing
studies that women are more prone to neuroticism, and that
women on average show “a [higher] interest in people rather
than [in] things,” while men are the opposite.21 The memo
challenges the design and focus of Google’s diversity initiatives
and calls on Google to recognize inherent differences between
populations.22 Damore denounces Google’s “politically correct
monoculture.”23 Damore has hired civil rights attorney, Harmeet
Dhillon, regarding a pending lawsuit against Google,24 and
Dhillon’s website calls for employees to speak out about Google’s
“discriminat[ing] against employees on the basis of their political
views.”25 Because California is a state in which employers are
banned from punishing employees based on political speech,26
could Google face liability for firing Damore?27 These examples
emphasize the need to create a uniform regulation across states;
a regulation that has legitimacy and accountability sufficient to
protect private employees’ freedom of political speech against
their employer’s discrimination.
20 Dan Eaton, Why it May Be Illegal for Google to Punish that Engineer Over
His Now Viral Anti-Diversity Memo, CNBC (Aug. 7, 2017, 4:01 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/07/it-may-be-illegal-for-google-to-punish-engineer-overanti-diversity-memo-commentary.html [https://perma.cc/PD3C-C2QW]; see also Matt
Young, Republican Lawyer Harmeet Dhillon Hired by Google Engineer James Damore to
Fight Discrimination Case, NEWS.COM.AU (Aug. 30, 2017, 1:02 PM), http://
www.news.com.au/technology/online/censorship/republican-lawyer-harmeet-dhillonhired-by-google-engineer-james-damore-to-fight-discrimination-case/news-story/dcea
ebf1172d097cd954b602e1da206d [https://perma.cc/DFJ8-MZAP].
21 Eaton, supra note 20; see also Kate Conger, Exclusive: Here’s The Full 10Page Anti-Diversity Screed Circulating Internally at Google, GIZMODO (Aug. 6, 2017,
8:00 AM), https://www.gizmodo.com.au/2017/08/exclusive-heres-the-full-10-page-antidiversity-screed-circulating-internally-at-google/ [https://perma.cc/7TK3-VPMT].
22 See Eaton, supra note 20.
23 Young, supra note 20.
24 Julia Carrie Wong, James Damore Sues Google, Alleging Intolerance of White
Male Conservatives, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2018, 18:10 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2018/jan/08/james-damore-sues-google-discrimination-white-male-conservatives
[https://perma.cc/F5UP-PAGL] (“The lawsuit claims that numerous Google managers
maintained ‘blacklists’ of conservative employees with whom they refused to work . . . . and
that Google’s firing[ ] of Damore . . . [was] discriminatory.”); see also Young, supra note 20.
25 Have You Experienced Illegal Employment Practices at Google?, DHILLON LAW
GROUP, (Aug. 22, 2017) https://www.dhillonlaw.com/blog/news/have-you-experiencedillegal-employment-practices-at-google/ [https://perma.cc/8XTY-F6H2] (asking that any
Google employee who has been discriminated against for their political views or has “[b]een
written up for ‘un-Googly’ conduct” come forward and join Damore’s litigation).
26 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 2018) (“No employer shall . . . attempt to
coerce or influence his employees through or by means of threat of discharge . . . to adopt
or follow or refrain from adopting or following any particular course or line of political
action or political activity.”).
27 See Eaton, supra note 20.
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This note will therefore call for greater consistency among
states regarding private employers’ and employees’ speech, which
will take the form of a federal statute to be passed under
Congress’s commerce powers.28 In Part I, this note examines
federal and various state statutes that protect private employees’
political speech, as well as consider practical problems with the
statutes’ scope and interpretation. Next, Part II of this note
addresses arguments on both sides of the political speech debate.
On one hand, the expansion of political speech protections for
employees may put at risk private employers’ legitimate interests
in choosing what type of person to employ. Alternatively, deeply
rooted democratic values may provide reasons to expand
protections. Part III of this note considers two modern case
studies that reflect the contentious aspects of this debate. Finally,
Part IV considers some alternatives, and ultimately advocates for
a federal statute that can be passed under Congress’s regulatory
interstate commerce powers. The statute will explicitly lay out the
type of political speech that is protected, will allow employees to
take civil action against discriminatory employers, and will also
balance competing interests by containing exceptions and
defenses available to certain employers.
I.

STATUTORY PROTECTION OF PRIVATE EMPLOYEES’
POLITICAL SPEECH

A.

The Trouble with “At-Will” Employment

After considering the difficulties of a private employer
who is being affected by the undesirable political views of an
employee, now place yourself in the position of an employee, who
is being affected by the political views of his or her private
employer.29 For example, think of an employer that mandates all
employees to support a certain candidate by attending rallies
and signing petitions in support.30 If an employee did not want
to perform these political activities, and in turn lost his or her
job, what remedies could this employee seek? Again, “if the
employer [here] were a government agency,” the answer would
be that the employer has “violate[d] the employees’ free speech
rights under the First Amendment.”31 If the employer were a
private entity, but in a state with statutory protections for
employees’ freedom of political speech, the law would afford the
28
29
30
31

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 945.
Id.
Id.
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employee some remedy.32 In most states, however, the private
employee would be out of luck.33
For over a century, the prevailing rule has been that
private sector employment is “at-will,”34 simply meaning that,
unless a statute or contract provides otherwise, an employment
relationship “can be terminated at any time for any reason.”35
This can be thought of as a “mutuality of obligation,” since an
employee retains the ability to quit at any point, and an employer
is able to discharge at any point.36 In the past, unions protected
private employees from “speech-related terminations” by
negotiating contracts that laid out specific, performance-related
termination requirements.37 Now that union membership has
declined and “the vast majority of . . . workers . . . are ‘employ[ed]
at-will,’” private employees have been left largely unprotected
from speech-related firings.38
As a common law rule, courts do not often stray from the
rigidity of at-will employment.39 Although courts have sometimes
upheld suits by employees on the ground of public policy, it is
more typical that courts refuse to recognize limits to the rule.40
For example,
an employee who claimed he was discharged because he would neither
vote for certain candidates in a city election nor coerce his family to
do so was told by an appellate court that he was not entitled to
damages even though the jury below had found he was wrongfully
discharged.41

Courts often “rely on [the] lack of mutuality of obligation” present
in at-will employment in their reasoning—emphasizing that
because the employee was not contractually bound for a definitive
time period, the employer also could not be bound, and was

Id. at 946.
Id. For many private employees, the worry that they may be fired or warned
for having political views that differ from their employers’ views is grounded in reality.
A recent study released by Harvard University states that where workers received their
employers’ political messages, 20 percent of those employers accompanied those
messages with at least one warning of “job loss, plant closure, or changes in wages and
hours.” Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, How Employers Recruit Their Workers into
Politics—And Why Political Scientists Should Care, 14 PERSP. ON POL. 410, 414 (2016).
34 Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 946.
35 Carroll, supra note 9, at 39.
36 Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time
for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 484–85 (1976).
37 Jeannette Cox, A Chill Around the Water Cooler: First Amendment in the
Workplace, 15 No. 2 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 12, 12–13 (2015).
38 Id.
39 Summers, supra note 36, at 487.
40 Id.
41 Id. (citing Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934)).
32
33
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therefore free to discharge the employee at any time.42 On the other
hand, there are scholars that remain hopeful about the “public
policy exceptions” to at-will employment that certain courts have
articulated43 because these exceptions could potentially be used to
vindicate the constitutional right to free speech.44 Such scholars
have highlighted that private employers’ freedom of political
speech is tied to the public conscience and must be protected, and
therefore decide that courts should apply a common law “public
policy exception” based on clear public policy.45 Needless to say,
those who question the bounds of at-will employment have
considered both public-policy based and statutory limits.
B.

Federal Protection for Private Employee Political Speech

When considering the current state of statutory limits to atwill employment, specifically the limits that hold private employers
accountable for taking adverse action against employees based on
their off-duty political activities, one could first turn to federal law.
“No federal statute explicitly protects employees’ political speech
from interference by private employers,” but a federal statute that
could be interpreted as providing some protection to private
employees’ speech is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).46
While this statute protects certain types of employee speech, the
federal law “does not apply to . . . employees [who are] not acting to
secure a group benefit.”47
Section 7 of the NLRA gives private employees “the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations . . . and to engage in . . . concerted activities for
Id. at 489; see also Bell, 75 S.W.2d at 613.
See Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 514–17 (Or. 1975) (awarding compensatory
damages to an employee who was fired because of her jury duty service, and discussing
instances “in which the employer’s reason or motive for discharging harms or interferes
with an important interest of the community and, therefore, justifies compensation to the
employee”); Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27–28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1959) (finding that the firing of an employee because of his refusal to commit perjury was
contrary to public policy, showed a lack of good faith on the part of the employer, and was
thus wrongful); Frampton v. Cent. Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E. 2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973)
(holding that a “[r]etaliatory discharge for filing a workmen’s compensation claim is a
wrongful, unconscionable act and should be actionable in a court of law”).
44 Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 946, 950.
45 Id. at 988.
46 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 499 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)); Carroll, supra note 9, at 48.
47 Note, Free Speech, the Private Employee, and State Constitutions, 91 YALE
L. J. 522, 526 (1982) [hereinafter Yale, Free Speech]; see also Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB., 437
U.S. 556, 564–65 (1978) (the Act, in part, “was intended to protect employees when they
engage in otherwise proper concerted activities in support of employees of employers
other than their own,” and it has long been “held that the ‘mutual aid or protection’
clause encompasses such activity”).
42
43
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the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”48 “Mutual aid and
protection” covers an employee’s ability to participate in strikes,
protests, and also “advocacy unrelated to traditional union
activity.”49 The NLRA therefore offers private employees some
First Amendment protections.50 In interpreting this section, the
Supreme Court has protected employee activity and held that the
“mutual aid or protection” clause is not limited to specific disputes
between an employee and the employer, but can also cover
methods for improving employment conditions “through channels
outside the immediate employer-employee relationship.”51 While
the Court has sometimes broadly covered employee speech
under Section 7, other decisions have narrowed this
interpretation, requiring that political speech also bear a close
relationship to the economic interests of employees in the scope
of their employment.52 The Supreme Court in Eastex Inc. v.
NLRB, for example, discussed limits to employee speech
protections, stating that there could be instances in which the
relationship between employee speech or activities is so
attenuated that it “cannot fairly be deemed to come within the
‘mutual aid or protection’ clause.”53 The Supreme Court did not
elaborate further, leaving it to the National Labor Relations
Board to “determine the outer boundaries of the clause’s
coverage.”54 As a whole, under Supreme Court precedent, these
protections are relatively limited, as the NLRA only protects
private employee political speech as far as it closely “relat[es] to
the terms and conditions of employment.”55 As it turns out, “the
more political the [private employees’] speech . . . the less likely
[federal] labor law is to protect it” in a comprehensive and
inclusive way.56

48 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012)).
49 Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public
Interests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 921, 922 (1992).
50 Id.
51 Carroll, supra note 9, at 50 (citing Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565).
52 Id. at 51–52.
53 Eastex, 437 U.S. at 567–68.
54 Rachel Simon, Comment, Workers on the March: Work Stoppages, Public
Rallies, and the National Labor Relations Act, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1273, 1287 (2007)
(citing Eastex, 437 U.S. at 568).
55 Mary Becker, How Free Is Speech at Work?, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 815, 842
(1996) (footnote omitted).
56 Id.
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State Protection for Private Employee Political Speech

About half of the country’s population lives in states that
generally prohibit employers from punishing employees based
on their political speech or activities.57 While some of these
jurisdictions have statutes that more generally protect employee
free speech, others more specifically protect employee speech on
political matters.58 Further, some of these political free speech
jurisdictions protect only certain types of political activities, “such
as endorsing or campaigning for a party, signing an initiative or
referendum petition, or giving a political contribution.”59 So, while
ranging from general to specific in their definitions of “political
speech,” these statutes are meant to shield private employees
from being fired or retaliated against based on certain political
viewpoints and activities.60 Similar to a protected trait in the
federal or state civil rights laws, these state statutes protect
certain characteristics (employees’ political opinions), and the
activities that go along with them.61
Legal scholars have pointed out various practical
problems with these types of statutes.62 Firstly, statutory
challenges rarely ever lead to a “final decision[ ] in court.”63 One
reason for this is that, “since the statutes give no civil remedies to
employees, the most interested parties in such cases have no
recourse in the courts, and provide no source of litigated cases.”64
Almost all of the statutory protections allow for only criminal
sanctions, which consist of small fines or imprisonment of the
employer’s agents.65 Although courts generally treat the criminal
sanctions as also generating a civil tort action,66 “the imposition
of a small fine” on employers alone does not sufficiently remedy
the employees who are retaliated against.67 Further,
“prosecutors generally seem to lack enthusiasm for initiating
cases under the statutes: there are few reported prosecutions of
Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 297.
Id.
59 Id. For example, statutes in California, Colorado, Guam, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, South Carolina, West Virginia, Seattle
(Washington), and Madison (Wisconsin) “bar employers from retaliating against
employees for engaging in political activities.” Id. at 313–18.
60 Carroll, supra note 9, at 58.
61 Id.
62 See id. at 59; Summers, supra note 36, at 495.
63 Carroll, supra note 9, at 59.
64 Id. (citing Summers, supra note 36, at 495).
65 Id. (citing Kelsay v. Motorola, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (Ill. 1978)).
66 Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 302.
67 Carroll, supra note 9, at 59 (quoting Kelsay v. Motorola, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359
(Ill. 1978)).
57
58
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employers for coercing their employees,” or otherwise interfering
with employee political speech.68
Even in states such as California and Louisiana, that do
offer civil remedies for employees whose employers have interfered
with their political opinions, there is still an underwhelming
amount of litigation brought under the statutes:69
The lack of litigation and the accompanying lack of court decisions
under the statutes seriously inhibit the statutes’ usefulness to
employees: without litigation and the resulting judicial clarifications
of the statutes, employees do not know what statutory protections
they can assert, what defenses are open to employers, or what level of
coercive intent on the part of employers is necessary for an employee
to recover damages.70

The second practical problem within this area of law is
that even in states with broadly worded statutes, under which
many activities could constitute political speech, state courts have
failed to specifically apply the statutes in ways that provide
effective protection for private employees.71 For example,
although states such as Louisiana and South Carolina have
statutes that prevent private employees from being fired or
retaliated against based on their political opinions,72 some district
courts have chosen to narrowly define what constitutes “political
speech.” In South Carolina, the statute’s protection is limited to
matters that are “directly related to the executive, legislative, and
administrative branches of Government, such as political party
affiliation, political campaign contributions, and the right to
vote.”73 In a narrowing of the statute’s application, the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina held that
an employee’s display of a Confederate flag was not considered
“political speech,” although the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit later opined that the display could
constitute an exercise of political rights.74 Courts in Louisiana
have also continuously denied relief under their political speech
protection statute, often asserting that the plaintiff and
Id. (citing Vulcan Last Co. v. State, 217 N.W. 412 (Wis. 1928)).
Id. at 60. Colorado, Delaware, and Puerto Rico also “statutorily provide civil
remedies for politically coerced employees.” Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 62.
72 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:961 (2011) (enacted 1938); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17560 (2011) (enacted 1950).
73 Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 313, (quoting Vanderhoff v.
John Deere Consumer Prods., Inc., No. C.A. 3:02-0685-22, 2003 WL 23691107, at *2
(D.S.C. Mar. 13, 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
74 Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 330 F.3d 250, 254, 262–63 (4th Cir. 2003), rev’d
on other grounds, 369 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
68
69
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defendant did not meet the requisite “employment relationship”
under the statute, given that the plaintiff was an uncontracted
“deputy” or “appointee” of the defendant, rather than an
employee.75 Even in a case in which an employee was able to
recover from his employer after being discharged for his political
views, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana relied primarily on other grounds, noting their
reluctance to apply the Louisiana employee political speech
protection statute, in part because “no court has apparently ever
cited or construed it since its passage in 1938.”76
Virginia, the site of the recent Unite the Right Rally in
Charlottesville,77 currently has no such statute. Virginia instead
“strongly adheres to the doctrine of at-will employment.”78
Virginia’s legislative history, however, reveals that around the
time of the passage of both Louisiana and South Carolina’s
political speech laws, a similar law was proposed in Virginia.79
The discussion of these statutes in the Reconstruction-era South
was brought on by a “Republican concern that southern
employers were pressuring their employees to vote against the
Republicans.”80 On December 9, 1867, framers of the Constitution
of the State of Virginia passionately discussed the “suffering
condition” of many Virginia employees, who reported that they
were fired because of exercising their right to vote for the
Republican Party.81 The language used throughout the heated
debate aligns with common arguments for and against
protecting private employees’ political speech, stating:
Here are hundreds and thousands of men in the State who say they
are willing to work, who are ready to work, who are begging for work,
and there is work to be done. But, in consequence of political
prejudices . . . these men are turned out of employment. Yet the very
men who need the labor . . . who have the capital to bestow for labor,

75 Boyer v. St. Amant, 364 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 365
So. 2d 1108 (La. 1978); Finkelstein v. Barthelemy, 565 So. 2d 1098, 1099 (La. Ct. App.
1990). Although these cases involved public employees, they exemplify the stringent
standard of recovery under the Louisiana statute.
76 McCormick v. Edwards, 479 F. Supp. 295, 302 (M.D. La. 1979), rev’d, 646
F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1981) (involving a public employee alleging that he was fired from his
job for purely political reasons).
77 Richard Fausset & Alan Feuer, Far-Right Groups Surge Into National View
in Charlottesville, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/farright-groups-blaze-into-national-view-in-charlottesville.html [https://perma.cc/Z6ZN-ND3E].
78 Harris & Chughtai, supra note 17.
79 Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 301 n.19., (citing DAVID
LLOYD PULLIAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE
FOUNDATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH TO THE PRESENT TIME 134 (1901)).
80 Id. at 300.
81 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 33, 43 (Richmond, New Nation 1868).
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those are the men who, in consequence of political prejudices, have
turned these poor people out . . . 82

Proponents of a resolution therefore argued that it be made a
misdemeanor for any employer to discharge an employee on the
basis of his political opinion.83 Those who opposed the proposition
argued that it would result in despotism, which would “break up
and destroy all transactions and business relations existing
between man and man—to strike at the very cornerstone of society
itself.”84 Despite the supporters’ continued arguments that it is
“harsh[ ] and vindictive[ ] ” for employers to fire employees because
they do not vote a certain way,85 the proposal was defeated and no
such statute was enacted.86
Taken together, private employees across the United
States are either left unprotected against their employers’
potential political speech discrimination or are subject to varied
and inconsistent forms of state protection. California, for
example, has a broad statute, which defines “political activities”
as meaning “[more] than just partisan or electoral activities.”87
California’s statute for employees’ freedom of political speech
states, “[n]o employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any rule,
regulation, or policy: (a) Forbidding or preventing employees from
engaging or participating in politics or from becoming candidates
for public office. (b) Controlling or directing, or tending to control
or direct the political activities or affiliations of employees.”88
California’s Supreme Court has articulated that political
activities cover more than just party matters, and instead cover
any speech or “activities involving the ‘espousal of a candidate or
cause,’” which therefore includes employees’ “participa[tion]
in . . . social movements such as the gay rights movement.”89
Following this decision, a federal district court similarly
construed “‘political activities’ to cover the holding of certain
views on drug and alcohol policy.”90
While these decisions seem to widen the interpretation of
California’s statute, they are a departure from previous
Id. at 44.
Id. at 46.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 44.
86 Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 301 n.19., (citing DAVID
LLOYD PULLIAM, supra note 79, at 134).
87 Id. at 313.
88 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101 (2018).
89 Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 313 (citing Gay Law
Students Ass’n. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 610 (Cal. 1979)).
90 Id., (citing Thompson v. Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp., No. C-94-4015
MHP, 1996 WL 162990, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1996)).
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applications.91 For example, the California Supreme Court
previously narrowly construed “political speech,” finding that an
employee could be legally fired “simply for being a Communist.”92
Though the broad language of the California law arguably comes
closest to protecting employees’ political speech, it is unclear
whether this broad interpretation will continue, or whether
California courts will revert to previous interpretations of political
speech.93 The unpredictability and inconsistency of these state
protections, or lack thereof, point to the need for a uniform
regulation across the United States—so that private employees are
not subjected to varying degrees of free speech restrictions across
state lines.
II.

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE EXPANSION OF
POLITICAL SPEECH PROTECTIONS

There are certainly valid arguments that employers should
be free to dissociate from employees whose views they find
objectionable. Employers have legitimate business interests to
prioritize, and their business’s success should not be at the whim of
an employee with radical or distasteful political opinions. In the
same vein, Volokh states in his summary of the employee-protective
state statutes, “[p]erhaps such statutes should not be copied by other
states, and perhaps they should even be repealed, which is what
happened in 1929 when Ohio repealed its ‘political activities’
statute.”94 On the other hand, the most basic reasons to strengthen
the freedom of political speech become more and more relevant:
For tens of millions of persons who are genuinely dependent on private
employers—dependent in the sense that they simply cannot afford to
lose their current jobs—freedom of political speech can be exercised
only subject to the forbearance of their employers. As economic power
becomes increasingly concentrated in the hands of large corporations,
citizens’ dependence on private employers grows and so does the
insecurity of free political speech.95

There are strong public policy interests in protecting political free
speech for private employees. Many Americans “spend about onethird of their lives” at work, and communication between
coworkers in the workplace is considered vital to both democratic

Carroll, supra note 9, at 60–62.
Id. at 62; see also Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
Cty., 171 P.2d 21, 24 (1946).
93 Carroll, supra note 9, at 62.
94 Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 301.
95 Carroll, supra note 9, at 36.
91
92
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society and “individual self-fulfillment.”96 This self-expression
argument is powerful given the value that the United States places
on being a country of diverse populations and ideas.97 Of course,
there are imposed limits on free speech that are integral to a
functional society, and protecting this sort of employee speech
might place too heavy a burden on the employer.98 The question
remains whether to continue imposing these limits on free speech
in the private workplace, even though the speech in question is
political and carries meaningful weight in a democratic system.
A.

Arguments Against the Expansion of Employee Political
Speech Protections

The most compelling argument against the expansion of
political speech protection in the private workplace involves the
employer’s freedom of expression and First Amendment rights.99
The government may encroach on First Amendment rights when
it “forces a party to tolerate [statements or activities] which a
reasonable listener would attribute to her.”100 In short,
employers do have the right to dissociate “from unwanted
attribution to them of ideological messages.”101 This attribution,
however, is only likely to happen in cases that involve the speech
of high-ranking employees and other employees who are thought
of as spokespersons of the entity, during both work hours and
while outside of work.102 Although the employees in question
here would not necessarily be thought of as “spokespeople” for
Google or a California hot dog eatery, it is possible that social
media and the publicity of the employees’ speech has caused
some level of attribution to their private employers, such that
these entities sought to release themselves from the appearance
of attribution by firing the employees.103
Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 989.
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L.
REV. 225, 225, 236 (2013) (arguing that employment law is justified in protecting
employees’ privacy and political speech, in the interests of social equality, “even if it
imposes meaningful costs on employers”).
98 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 538.
99 Id. at 537.
100 Id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977); West Va. Bd. Of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
101 Id.
102 Id.; see also Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 391 (10th Cir. 1976) (finding that
the First Amendment did not prevent a public employee who held a policymaking office
from being fired based on expressions made against the policy goals of the governor); cf.
Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 578 (7th Cir. 1972) (where the
First Amendment prevented a non-policymaking state official from being fired solely for
his refusal to transfer his political allegiance from one party to another).
103 See discussion infra Part III.
96
97
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Beyond ordinary attribution, if the employer itself is a
“representative organization,” then its free speech rights are
thought of as “proxies for the expressive and associational rights
of its members.”104 For example, “[a]n eco-friendly energy
company should be able to decide to hire only ‘green’ employees
and to terminate the employee who denies the existence of
human-induced climate change.”105 The private institutions to be
discussed in this note, however, cannot be thought of as political
or ideological associations, because they “exist[ ] primarily for
economic purposes.”106 These entities do not exist solely “to
disseminate an ideological message.”107 They will therefore not
endure substantial harm to their associational rights as a result
of expanded protections of employee speech.108
Another argument against the expansion of political
speech protection in the private workplace involves the
employer’s property interests.109 These property interests
revolve around the employer’s right to protect and maintain
their own businesses and not be subject to the government’s
impairment of their financial success.110 Under the Supreme
Court’s precedent, such property protection interests not only
apply to individual or smaller-scale employers but also extend
equally to corporations.111 An employer’s financial success could
be put in danger if the employer is forced to retain an employee
who reduces sales or harms the business’s reputation in some
way.112 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution forbid the government from taking private
property for public use “without just compensation.”113 If the
federal government were to protect employee speech at work, it
could be interfering with the employer’s interest in determining how
104 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 538 (footnote omitted); see also NAACP
v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458–62 (1958) (discussing that in
certain associational groups, members have such a “nexus” that allows them to act as
representatives of the organization) (“Inviolability of privacy in group association may
in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association,
particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”).
105 Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 980.
106 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 538.
107 Id. at 539.
108 Id. at 538.
109 See id. at 533.
110 See id. at 534.
111 See Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations
Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation after First National Bank
v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L. J. 1347, 1362 (1979).
112 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 535.
113 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (where the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment was applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
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the employer’s property is being used, the employer’s ability to
exclude others from his or her property, and the employer’s interest
in the value of the property.114 If these “[t]hree . . . ‘sticks’ [in] the
‘bundle’” of interests were “substantially impair[ed]”, then protecting
employee speech could arguably create an unlawful taking.115
Whether an unconstitutional taking has occurred
depends on the aggregate effect of government action, so any
statute that seeks to protect employee speech should take into
“consider[ation] any loss of property value to the employer
resulting from the speech.”116 The loss in value, or expected loss,
to a private entity as a result of the imposed speech protections
alone would not likely constitute a takings claim.117 Even
considering that the employee protection could constitute a
taking, the protection would clearly satisfy the takings clause
requirement that the government taking be for a public purpose
or public good.118 Here, that public good is freedom of political
speech, directly relating to the public welfare and society as a
whole.119 It is unclear in what way employers could be justly
compensated for such a taking under the Fifth Amendment,120 as
employers would likely need to allege financial impairment, and
thus recover their monetary loss based on the market value of
their businesses at the time the taking took effect.121
The final argument against the expansion of employee
political speech protections stems from the previously
mentioned associational right—the employer’s right to privacy
and freedom from governmental intrusion.122 For employers that
Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 533–34.
Id. at 533–34; see also Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83
(1980) (The examination of whether such speech could constitute a taking “entails
inquiry into such factors as the character of the governmental action, its economic
impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.”); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) (holding that the government’s attempt
to create a public right of access to a private pond interfered with the pond owner’s
reasonable investment-back expectations. “[T]he Government’s attempt to create a
public right of access to the improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary regulation or
improvement for navigation as to amount to a taking. . . .”).
116 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 534–35.
117 See L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 YALE L. J. 52, 59–60 (1936); see also Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at
83 (finding no support for the contention that the government’s allowance of petitioners
on shopping center property would “unreasonably impair the value or use of their
property as a shopping center”).
118 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 535; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
119 Id.
120 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
121 See Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2015).
122 See id. at 540; cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace,
Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 63–65 (2000) (“The limits that freedom of
association places on the antidiscrimination principle are understood to represent a
judgment about the function of intimate and expressive associations in a diverse and
114
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operate as small family businesses and the like, placing
protections on employees’ speech could “intrude upon the
constitutionally protected privacy of the individual, the home,
and the family.”123 Legal scholars have noted the difficulty in
determining which spaces are suitable forums to allow for
freedom of speech, versus which spaces are too private for the
government to regulate.124 Consider, for example, a situation in
which the owners of a small shop are Holocaust survivors, or the
children of Holocaust survivors. If the family were to find out
that one of their cashiers wrote editorial articles in favor of the
Nazi agenda, the employers should not be subject to the
government’s protection of this employee’s job.125 Nevertheless,
“[a]s a business begins to acquire more characteristics of a
corporate bureaucracy and fewer of a family enterprise . . . the
employer’s interest in privacy diminishes proportionally.”126
Given these factors, the constitutional rights of employers,
particularly the employers who will be most greatly affected by
such employee speech protections, should be taken into
consideration in any proposed statute.
B.

Arguments in Favor of the Expansion of Political Speech
Protections

Given the constitutional arguments against expanding
political speech protections to private employees, compelling
arguments must be made in order to explain the need for federal
protection. A critical reason for this need is that free speech,
particularly political speech, is increasingly under attack in
everyday life.127 First Amendment law professor, Joel Gora, points
to the “instantaneous condemnation and punishment of fraternity
members for singing racially offensive lyrics at a social event, the
democratic society. But the denial of associational freedom and the validation of the
antidiscrimination principle in other institutions, particularly the workplace, effectively
assigns to those institutions, and to the relations that form there, another sort of function
that is equally important in a diverse democratic society.”).
123 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 540; see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”).
124 See Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment
Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1537, 1567 (1998).
125 In-Person Conversation with Joel Gora, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law
School, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Nov. 2, 2017).
126 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 540; see also Mulroy & Moorman, supra
note 2, at 980 (“At least, in a small business setting, such an employer may have a free
association interest in choosing the persons with whom he spends forty hours a week.”).
127 Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First
Amendment, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 63, 72 (2016).
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brazen murder of journalists for producing anti-Muslim cartoons
and commentary, or the cancelling of celebrity contracts for
making offensive remarks or expressing unpopular views” as
modern examples of suppressing or silencing free speech.128 This
suppression is problematic because free speech holds an integral
place in democratic societies.129 It goes towards members of society
participating in decision-making, individual self-expression, and
the overall pursuit of intellectual progress and change.130
Many have recognized the intrinsic importance of free
speech, not only for government entities and employees, but also
for private employees.131 In cases where employee political
speech is restricted, the employer has economic power over the
employee, and wields that economic power in order to enhance
his or her control over the political sphere.132 The fact that
employers hold this economic power over employees is especially
meaningful given the proliferation of at-will employment.133 In
light of the decline of union membership, many employees lack
the ability to bargain with their employers for protective
termination requirements.134 On a fundamental level, this is
threatening to the idea of social equality, the dynamics of which
have political implications:135 “Workers, fearful of losing their
jobs, will suppress their own political views or express views
with which they do not agree. The result will be a skewed
political discourse, in which employers’ voices are amplified and
workers’ are squelched.”136
As a result, the political discourse may lack the viewpoints
of employees that could be “particularly distinctive and
important.”137 Philosophers have stressed the importance of
citizens seeing each other as political equals, and the importance
Id. at 72–73.
Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 529; see also Nadine Strossen, Freedom
of Speech and Equality: Do We Have to Choose?, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 185, 188 (2016) (noting
that the “safe spaces” on college campuses “where students are shielded from ideas they
consider offensive or hateful” are “opposite . . . the outlook” and responsibilities reflected
in the First Amendment).
130 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 529.
131 See generally Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47 (arguing for greater federal
protection of private employees’ freedom of speech); Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2
(recommending that courts use a “public policy exception” to protect private employees’
freedom of speech); Carroll, supra note 9 (advocating for a modal statute or common-law
rules that would protect private employees from “politically motivated firings”);
Bagenstos, supra note 97 (using social equality theory to argue for government
regulation of the private employment relationship).
132 Bagenstos, supra note 97, at 256.
133 See discussion supra notes 37–38.
134 See discussion supra notes 37–38.
135 Bagenstos, supra note 97, at 264.
136 Id. at 256.
137 Id.
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of citizens aggregating their opinions when participating in
politics, and in the epistemic search for a common good.138
Strengthening these elements of the democratic system works to
maintain the government’s authority and legitimacy.139
In addition to losing out on the range of ideas that make
up a complete political landscape, there are also serious concerns
relating to employees as individuals140:
We protect free speech not merely as a means of promoting discussion
and participation in democratic government, and not merely to
further the discovery of truth through “the marketplace of ideas,” but
also because individual self-expression is good for its own sake. It
leads to happier, more fulfilled lives: a better quality of life for the
individuals doing the expressing, and because these individuals are
more fulfilled, a more pleasant environment for the friends and
coworkers around them.141

In other words, not only does the suppression of employee political
speech diminish the collective search for truth that is vital to a
functional democracy, but it also has negative implications for the
personal and social interactions that employees experience in their
everyday lives.142 It is for these reasons that we must remember
that private employees are also members of a democratic society—
a society that benefits from the expression of conflicting ideas.
Furthermore, the advancement and expansion of
technology has resulted in greater exposure of off-duty speech
that has the potential to impact a person’s career or prospects.143
Given “the phenomenon of ‘going viral,’ one slip of the tongue,
caught on camera or recorder” has the ability to cause serious
damage to people’s lives.144 This technology, among other forms
138 See DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL
FRAMEWORK 108 (Princeton U. Press ed., 2008) (advancing the idea of “epistemic
proceduralism,” which expresses that democratic authority and legitimacy is rooted in
people’s belief that the majority’s outcome was determined through a collective search
for the truth, and further expresses that this epistemic quality gives individuals moral
reasons to follow laws with which they disagree); see also JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT & DISCOURSES, pt. 1 (E.P. Dutton & Co. ed., 1913) (“Born a citizen of
a free state and member of the sovereign people, however feeble the influence of my voice
in public affairs, the right to vote upon them imposes upon me the duty of instructing
myself. Whenever I meditate upon governments I am happy to find in my investigations
new reasons for loving that of my own country.”).
139 ESTLUND, supra note 138, at 108. (“The structure [of democratic theory] is
similar to what we might naturally say about the authority of a jury’s verdict in a
criminal trial: the jury system is designed with great attention to its epistemic value
(among other things). When a jury reaches a verdict, its legitimacy and authority do not
depend on its correctness, but they do depend on the epistemic value of the procedure.”).
140 Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 989.
141 Id. (footnotes omitted).
142 See id.
143 See Gora, supra note 127, at 72.
144 Id.
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of surveillance, can lead to the alarming effect of “suppress[ing]
criticism of [the] government.”145 Scholars recognize that
technological advances have directly impacted employment, by
increasing the employer’s ability to discover personal information
about the beliefs and opinions of their employees.146 In modern
employment, employees’ personal reputations are increasingly
public and “more easily [linked] to their employers, such that a
drunken Friday night tirade or an offensive tweet can bring
down the weight of thousands or even millions of social-media
participants onto the person and their employer.”147 Therefore,
employers are now amply armed with the “ability to coerce large
numbers of employees’ beliefs and opinions.”148 Finally, it is not
enough to say that employees who do not like their employer’s
free speech restrictions can find another job, perhaps in a
different state.149 “For most of these people, the prospect of losing
their jobs is a significant hardship, and has a formidable chilling
effect on their speech.”150 Therefore, because of the employer’s
ability to coerce, and because of the value of freedom of political
speech as a core ideal, there is a need to protect employee speech
on the federal level.
III.

MODERN EXAMPLES OF PRIVATE EMPLOYEES AND
CONTENTIOUS POLITICAL SPEECH

A.

Google and James Damore’s Diversity Memo

Analyzing various modern contexts in which this problem
has emerged will shed light on both sides of the employee
political speech argument and demonstrate the need for
consistency in free speech protections. As previously mentioned,
former Google employee, James Damore, was recently fired for
posting a memo challenging Google’s diversity efforts.151 The tenpage memo, entitled “Google’s Ideological Echo Chamber,”
“argues that women are underrepresented in [the] tech [industry]
not
because [of] . . . bias,
but
[instead] because of
inherent . . . differences between men and women.”152 Damore

145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at 72–73.
Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 528–29.
Bodie, supra note 14, at 266.
Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 529.
Mulroy & Moorman, supra note 2, at 989.
Id.
See discussion supra notes 20–27.
Conger, supra note 21.
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posted the memo to one of Google’s internal message boards in
August of 2017, and it subsequently went viral.153
In the memo, Damore expresses his goal to “have an
honest discussion” about “Google’s political bias,” which he
asserts has resulted in the “silencing” of ideological
differences.154 The memo goes on to discuss studies that detail
the biological and personality differences between men and
women, which result in women being less represented in the tech
industry and in top leadership positions.155 He accuses Google of
adhering to “several discriminatory practices,” in order “to
achieve equal gender and race representation.”156 Damore lastly
offers measures that Google could take in order to improve the
company’s culture, which include de-moralizing diversity,
stopping the alienation of conservatives, as well as reconsidering
and limiting Google’s mandatory unconscious bias trainings.157
Google later fired Damore for crossing the line by
perpetuating gender stereotypes, which Google states “is contrary
to [its] basic values,” as well as its Code of Conduct.158 While
Damore’s memo includes problematic generalizations, it is worth
noting that he also seems to be voicing concerns about a modern
trend towards the suppression of speech.159 Thus, as the former
employee has begun exploring legal remedies, it is interesting to
consider whether Damore’s expression of ideological speech might
be protected under either federal or state law.
If Damore seeks to recover under section 7 of the NLRA,
he would need to show that the distribution of his memo was a
form of “concerted activity” that closely relates to his
employment.160 Although “there is no evidence that
Damore . . . was trying to organize a union[,] . . . he could argue
that . . . [his call] for the inclusion of more diverse ideological
viewpoints at Google[ ] amounted to ‘concerted activities’
protected under the law.”161 In fact, Damore told the New York
153 Christine Emba, The Google Memo Isn’t the Interesting Part of the Story,
WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-googlememo-isnt-the-interesting-part-of-the-story/2017/08/11/de3f8876-7ecb-11e7-9d08-b79
f191668ed_story.html?utm_term=.c15acccc195a [https://perma.cc/SGC7-S8SA].
154 Conger, supra note 21.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Young, supra note 20.
159 See discussion supra Section II.B.
160 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012)); see also Becker, supra note 55 at 842.
161 Jeff John Roberts, Fired Google Employee Wants to Sue—and He May
Have a Case, FORTUNE (Aug. 8, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/08/google-memolegal/ [https://perma.cc/U69K-KVZD].
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Times that he has “a legal right to express [his] concerns about
the terms and conditions of [his] working environment . . . which
is what [his] document does.”162 Still, “Damore would [also] have
to show that his memo was more than” simply his own
commentary, and that he was calling on others to participate in
a conversation about Google’s policies.163 Overall, Google seems
to have fired Damore due to his controversial views about gender
differences, and not due to his complaints about the company’s
policies.164 Because those particular controversial comments
seem to have an insufficient relationship to the terms and
conditions of his employment, it seems that Damore’s federal
law claim is not likely to succeed.
Damore might have better luck pursuing recovery under
California’s state statute.165 Under the broad reading of this
statute, Damore’s views might constitute an “espousal of
a . . . cause,” which includes an employee’s participation in social
movements.166 The memo encourages ending a “politically correct
monoculture that maintains its hold by shaming dissenters into
silence.”167 Damore speaks directly to social structure and cultural
change, thereby constituting the type of ideological advocacy
California’s statute seeks to protect.168 While Damore’s memo
proved to be controversial, the former employee would likely be
able to make a showing that Google’s adverse action against him
was in conflict with his state’s protection of political speech. On the
other hand, one writer for the Washington Post called Damore a
“hostile-workplace complaint waiting to happen,” because of his
use of “insulting rhetoric and disregard for institutional norms.”169
Because of this, she says, Damore is “a business liability,” one that
the private company was within their rights to fire.170
Nevertheless, if Damore was in fact fired for his views—even if they
were a departure from institutional norms—then Google has taken

162 Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Fires Engineer Who Wrote Memo Questioning
Women in Tech, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/07/
business/google-women-engineer-fired-memo.html [https://perma.cc/QM4Q-RAPT].
163 Jack Greiner, Greiner: “OK, Google, Search Free Speech at Work,”
CINCINNATI.COM (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/money/2017/08/30/
greiner-ok-google-search-free-speech-work/597911001/ [https://perma.cc/MJ8E-MD9V].
164 See Young, supra note 20.
165 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1101; see also discussion supra Section I.C. (discussing the
court’s widening interpretation of the California statute).
166 Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 313 (quoting Gay Law
Students Ass’n. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 610 (Cal. 1979)).
167 Conger, supra note 21.
168 See Volokh, White Supremacist Rally, supra note 3.
169 Emba, supra note 153.
170 Id.
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illegal adverse action against this employee on the basis of political
speech, speech which the state of California voted to protect.
B.

Private Employers and Charlottesville Rally
Participants

On August 11, 2017, white supremacists and neo-Nazis
assembled in Charlottesville, Virginia, to rally against the
removal of a statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee.171
Protestors “invoked Ku Klux Klan imagery and [reportedly]
shouted, ‘Jews will not replace us’ and ‘white lives matter.’”172 In
the chaos of white supremacists clashing with counter protestors,
there were many injuries, and a woman was run over and killed
by a car driven by a white supremacist rally participant.173
Following the violence, people have taken to social media to urge
employers to take action against white supremacists who
attended the rally:
Indeed, a Twitter account with the handle @yesyoureracist has sought
help in identifying those who participated with the white nationalists
in Charlottesville. With the assistance of its followers,
@yesyoureracist has successfully pressured some employers—
including a restaurant in Berkeley, California—to fire employees
based on their actions in Charlottesville, and it’s likely that other
employers will come under similar public pressure.174

An article published in the Virginia Employment Law Letter
about the Charlottesville rally, or the “Unite the Right” rally,175
points out that “Virginia strongly adheres to the doctrine of atwill employment,” and that private employers are within their
rights to fire employees for their participation in political
protests.176 The article also suggests, however, that if employers
are “truly interested in taking a moral stan[ce] against racism,”
“a more productive response [might] be to reinforce in [the]
workplace” the uniting values of tolerance and inclusion.177 This,
it is argued, will bring us closer to achieving the “American ideal
that all people are created equal.”178 It goes without saying that
Harris & Chughtai, supra note 17.
Caleb Pershan, Top Dog Employee Who Participated in Charlottesville White
Supremacist Rally Resigns, SAN FRANCISCO EATER (Aug. 14, 2017, 10:31 AM PDT),
https://sf.eater.com/2017/8/14/16144078/top-dog-cole-white-charlottesville-berkeley
[https://perma.cc/MYW3-TK5F].
173 Harris & Chughtai, supra note 17.
174 Id.
175 Fausset & Feuer, supra note 77.
176 Harris & Chughtai, supra note 17.
177 Id.
178 Id.
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172
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white supremacist and neo-Nazi speech is both hateful and
morally repugnant, but it is important to recognize that
protecting even abhorrent political speech would serve to protect
American democratic ideals.
Although Virginia employees who attended the
Charlottesville rally are left relatively unprotected, there is still the
question of the employee from Berkeley, California, who was fired
after his employer responded to tweets that identified him at the
rally.179 The Twitter account posted a photo of the employee, Cole
White, with a caption that notes his place of employment as Top
Dog restaurant in Berkeley.180 A later post by the same account
includes a message from Top Dog, in which they relay the news
that they will no longer be employing Cole White.181 Cole White’s
political activity, like that of James Damore, is arguably the type
of ideological advocacy and participation in a social movement that
the California state statute protects.182 Although Cole White may
have a statutory claim against Top Dog, the impact of protecting
political speech should also be taken into account here, where the
company is a smaller employer. Revisiting this situation,
specifically against the backdrop of arguments opposing the
expansion of employee speech protection,183 will illuminate and
resolve some real-world concerns.
First, to address the issue of attribution,184 the political
action of an employee was ultimately the reason for Top Dog’s
overwhelming exposure into the Twitterverse.185 Proof that Top
Dog felt the need to dissociate their restaurant from the
ideological messages of Cole White came in the form of a sign on
the restaurant’s door stating, “[e]ffective Saturday 12th August,
Cole White no longer works at Top Dog. The actions of those in
Charlottesville are not supported by Top Dog. We believe in
individual freedom and voluntary association for everyone.”186 In
short, Top Dog’s concerns about being closely associated with a
179 See Wilkinson & Parry, supra note 1. Reports are conflicting as to whether
Cole White was fired or if he voluntarily resigned from Top Dog. See Rocha, supra note
1; see also Ashley Dejean, The Case for Naming and Shaming White Supremacists,
MOTHER JONES (Aug. 17, 2017, 4:09 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/08/
the-case-for-naming-and-shaming-white-supremacists/ [https://perma.cc/XUE8-KH23].
For the purposes of this discussion, I will consider possible repercussions to the employer
if the restaurant is accused of wrongfully terminating the employee.
180 @YesYoureRacist, supra note 1.
181 @YesYoureRacist, TWITTER (Aug. 13, 2017, 8:42 AM), https://twitter.com/
YesYoureRacist/status/896713553666871296 [https://perma.cc/7JT8-SU2K].
182 See discussion supra Section III.A. & Section I.C.
183 See discussion supra Section II.A.
184 Id.
185 Twitterverse, O XFORD D ICTIONARIES , https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/twitterverse [https://perma.cc/YCK7-TY3Q].
186 Rocha, supra note 1.
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neo-Nazi may be legitimate, since social media users had
successfully made the restaurant widely known as the employer
of a person with undesirable political ideas.187 The fact remains,
however, that Cole White’s actions were taken during off-work
hours, off the premises of the restaurant, and in a different
state.188 Despite the social media “naming and shaming,”189 it is
unreasonable to think that an employee of a small hot dog
restaurant acts as a spokesperson for the company whether on
or off the job.190
Although this social media attack on Cole White may be
viewed as the unnecessary airing of his dirty laundry, others
may view the exposing of Cole White as a warranted safety
measure, necessary to protect the general public from neo-Nazi
hate speech, which can be harmful and traumatic.191 The
definition of “hate speech” differs in other countries, and in some
countries Cole White’s participation in the neo-Nazi rally would
be punishable by law.192 The United States Supreme Court,
however, has a history of protecting even hateful forms of speech,
denying First Amendment “shortcut[s]” and creating safeguards
against the suppression of core political expression.193 And whereas
hate speech is a protected form of speech under First Amendment
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has not protected “fighting
words”194 that incite “imminent lawless action”195 or words “which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.”196 While much of the speech at the
Charlottesville rally would likely fall under protected First
Amendment speech, some argue that participants may have
crossed into fighting words “when they began chanting racist

See Dejean, supra note 179.
Rocha, supra note 1.
189 Dejean, supra note 179.
190 See Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 537.
191 See Dejean, supra note 179.
192 See Frederick Schauer, When Speech Meets Hate, U. VA. MAG. (2017),
http://uvamagazine.org/articles/when_speech_meets_hate [https://perma.cc/6VEN-AP4V].
193 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 366–67 (2003) (holding that the First
Amendment does not allow the state to take the “shortcut” of banning all cross burnings,
without distinguishing whether the speech at hand is done with the intent to threaten or
intimidate); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (holding that the
First Amendment does not allow the state to ban cross burnings based on “hostility—or
favoritism—towards the underlying message” contained in such expression); Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”).
194 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572–73 (1942).
195 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–49 (1969).
196 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
187
188
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and homophobic slurs to specific people on the streets.”197 Given
the unfortunate violence that ensued, there is an argument to be
made that some participants were partaking in impermissible
and unprotected incitement.198 Nevertheless, the facts made
public about Cole White do no more than portray him as a
participant in the Unite the Right Rally, and for the purposes of
free speech analysis, it is useful to assume that he was there to
voice his vile opinions, but likely not to cause violence.
Still, to address another concern of those opposing the
expansion of private employees’ free speech protections, any
protection of an employee such as Cole White must also be
balanced against the negative effect on the employers’ property
interests, namely in maintaining their business. In considering
this issue of an unlawful taking, it is notable that “complaints of
lost potential profits . . . have [often] constituted weak takings
claims.”199 Instead, “[t]he aggregate effect of a substantial loss of
value, together with a partial loss of the right to exclude,” are
the factors that could result in an unlawful taking.200 Without
speculating as to the exact loss to Top Dog if they were to be
statutorily compelled to continue employing Cole White, it is
entirely possible that the result would be a substantial loss and
an unreasonable burden on this small-sized restaurant. While
the political speech that Cole White took part in is the type of
speech that the federal government should protect, it is also
important for any solution to this issue to take into consideration
and to adjust for any substantial burden on the smaller, less
“Googly”201 employers.
IV.

SOLUTION: THE NEED FOR FEDERAL PROTECTION

To regulate protection for private employees, Congress
should enact a statute to be passed under its broad interstate
commerce powers.202 The statute’s substance should reflect the
197 Alexia Fernández Campbell, The Limits of Free Speech for White
Supremacists Marching at Unite the Right 2, Explained, VOX (Aug. 12, 2018, 1:51 PM
EDT) https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/8/10/17670554/unite-the-right-dcfree-speech-first-amendment [https://perma.cc/KB6J-GT77].
198 See id.
199 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 534; see also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51, 66 (1979) (“[T]he interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less
compelling than other property-related interests.”); Jacob Ruppert, Inc. v. Caffey, 251
U.S. 264, 303 (1920) (dismissing a takings claim where “there was no appropriation of
private property, but merely a lessening of value due to a permissible restriction imposed
upon its use.”).
200 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 534.
201 Have You Experienced Illegal Employment Practices at Google?, supra note 25.
202 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

2018] THE NEED TO PROTECT PRIVATE EMPLOYEES’ SPEECH

215

idea that employers should be prevented from taking adverse
action against employees on the basis of their political affiliations
or actions, which they express while off-duty, while allowing
“exceptions for particularly small companies, the highest-level
managers, and a confined class of individuals hired specifically to
engage in political speech on behalf of the employer.”203 The type
of speech, employees’ remedies, and employers’ defenses and
exceptions should be laid out in a way that echoes this main
purpose and accounts for a balancing of interests.204
Before discussing the statute’s content, it is worth
addressing why the state statutory scheme is insufficient to stand
up to the realities of a modern and integrated society. Consider
two different employees at a political event in New York over a
weekend. One, a California employee, cannot be fired for their
speech because of a state statute.205 The other, a Virginia
employee, can be fired for the same conduct, and has no statutory
protection. Although these people stood at the same event,
holding the same signs and chanting the same words, they
experience different results that have real and tangible impacts
on their lives. Despite where one falls on the political spectrum, it
is of the utmost importance to recognize the value of political
participation by members of all states and of ending the
suppression of political speech in our everyday lives.206 Ending the
suppression begins with imposing a consistent and effective
federal statute that prohibits employers from taking adverse
action against employees on the basis of their political views.
A.

The Type of Speech to be Protected

Under the case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., the Supreme Court upheld the passage of the NLRA
because of Congress’s power to reach activities that place
burdens on interstate activity.208 Under this decision, Congress
has the power to regulate “the organized activities of private
employees [in order to] promote industrial peace and . . . protect
interstate commerce.”209 There, the Court found that recognizing
207

Bagenstos, supra note 97, at 254.
See Carroll, supra note 9, at 78–80. My proposed statute is inspired largely
by the one proposed in Carroll’s article, but departs from Carroll’s proposed statute by
providing more stringent requirements as to which employers are subject to the statute.
205 See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101–1102 (West 2018).
206 See Gora, supra note 127, at 72–73.
207 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
208 See Carroll, supra note 9, at 82–83, (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp,
301 U.S. at 36–37).
209 Id. at 83 (citing Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 41–43).
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the right of employees to self-organize would be “an essential
condition of industrial peace,” as it would reduce labor
disturbances and refusals by employers and employees to confer
and negotiate.210 In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court
decided that Congress’s protections under this clause did not
need to be exclusively in the realm of transactions that were in
the “flow of interstate . . . commerce.”211 Instead, the “[b]urdens
and obstructions [that Congress regulates] may be due to
injurious action springing from other sources.”212 Here, the
protection of private employees’ freedom of political speech could
remedy state law inconsistencies, and prevent employees from
relocating to different states due to a lack of protection by their
state laws, or due to their need to find a new place of employment
after their employers take action against them. As modern
technology brings about the increased exposure of private
employees’ off-work political speech, there may be a similar
increase in the amount of people moving from one state to
another, and potentially disrupting the commercial landscape.
Further, Google, and other tech-giants of the country213 have
impacts far beyond the states in which they are headquartered,
and thus their policies have the potential to manipulate labor
trends across the country, by favoring employees whose speech
is “acceptable,” and silencing factions of dissenting employees.
The proposed statute would therefore be close in function
to section 7 of the NLRA, as it would prohibit employers from
taking adverse action against employees on the basis of certain
protected speech.214 Instead of the NLRA’s protection of employee
speech that relates to concerted activities and the terms and
conditions of employment, this statute would protect employee
speech that involves their “political views, expressions,
affiliations, or activities.”215 The statute makes it illegal to
threaten, terminate, suspend, or discipline an employee when
that action is taken in order to coerce or retaliate against an
employee on the basis of this political speech.216 Here, political
speech should be cast in a light similar to the interpretation
under California law. Political views should encompass not only
party politics, but also ideological advocacy, along with the
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 42.
Id. at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
212 Id.
213 Farhad Manjoo, The Upside of Being Ruled by the Five Tech Giants, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/technology/five-tech-giantsupside.html [https://perma.cc/R567-N2B8].
214 See discussion supra Section I.B.
215 Carroll, supra note 9, at 78.
216 Id.
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“espousal of a candidate or a cause.”217 To ensure that the courts
are not left to such discretionary interpretation, what
constitutes “political” speech should be explicitly defined in the
statute, as “having to do with issues, ideas, arguments,
ideologies, or positions that deal with broad social policy choices,
the organization, conduct, and powers of government, and
similar matters of concern to the general public.”218 Both James
Damore’s memo and Cole White’s rally attendance would satisfy
this definition of political speech.219
B.

The Available Remedies

The current state statutes that protect employee speech
do not provide adequate civil remedies for employees.220
Therefore, the proposed statute would allow for employees to
take civil action against their employers.221 Under the statute,
the employee could recover both actual damages and punitive
damages, and if the employee prefers, he or she could “seek
reinstatement with back pay in lieu of punitive damages.”222 The
possibility for employees to seek recourse would adequately hold
employers accountable, and serve to remedy employees for any
adverse employment action taken against them on the basis of
their political speech.
C.

Employer Exceptions and Defenses

The passage of a statute as far-reaching as this could be
subject to constitutional scrutiny by the courts, and therefore
certain exceptions must be made in order to withstand judicial
scrutiny and protect the interests of smaller companies.223 In
order for Congress to use their regulatory commerce powers, the
regulated activity must be shown to harm interstate
commerce.224 Here, “politically coercive or politically motivated
actions by employers against employees could be shown” to be
the relevant harm to interstate commerce.225 For some private
entities like Google, it is clear that any of the company’s
217 Volokh, Statutory Protections, supra note 10, at 313 (citing Gay Law
Students Ass’n. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co,, 595 P.2d 592, 610 (Cal. 1979)).
218 Carroll, supra note 9, at 79.
219 See discussion supra Part III.
220 See discussion supra Section I.C.
221 Carroll, supra note 9, at 80–81.
222 Id. at 78.
223 See id. at 83.
224 Id.
225 Id.
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“objectionable employment practices”226 would have effects on
interstate commerce that are well within Congress’s authority.
Companies like Google, Apple, and Facebook are “tech giants,”
whose power over society’s interactions is “closer to that of
governments than of mere corporations.”227 It is not as clear,
however, to see the effects that smaller, private entities have on
interstate commerce—and for those entities, it is not as clear
whether Congress has the authority to regulate them.
In order to avoid this constitutional scrutiny, and to
simultaneously avoid substantially impairing the interests of
smaller entities,228 the statute will allow for a “floor,” that
dictates the types of businesses that are subject to the statute.229
The floor will be determined by the entity’s gross income, the
number of employees the entity employs, and any other financial
considerations that Congress deems appropriate. The goal of the
floor will be to exempt private entities that are smaller, more
intimately connected in the workplace, and less like larger
“corporate bureaucrac[ies].”230 If the business is small and falls
below the floor set in place, then it is exempt. This scheme is
similar to the Mrs. Murphy exemption to the Fair Housing Act,
under which landlords who own “dwellings intended to be
occupied by four or fewer families” are exempted from certain
housing discrimination prohibitions.231 In the case of Mrs.
Murphy, the exemption arguably “guards her First Amendment
right not to associate.”232 Here, those same associational rights
are secured for the exempted small businesses, who are free to
fire employees on any basis. This quells the worries brought up
in the earlier hypothetical about the possible responsibilities of
a small shop owned by Holocaust survivors or their children.233
Despite overcoming these worries, the exemption allows
people like Mrs. Murphy to discriminate, and therefore allows for
the infringement of the other party’s right to be free from

Id.
See Manjoo, supra note 213.
228 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 534.
229 In-Person Conversation with Joel Gora, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law
School, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Nov. 2, 2017) (discussing the idea for this statutory “floor,”
and balancing the divergent interests of employees and employers).
230 Yale, Free Speech, supra note 47, at 540 (citing T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 682 (1970).
231 James D. Walsh, Note, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs.
Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 605, 605 (1999);
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (2012).
232 Walsh, supra note 231. at 606 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Educ., 431 U.S.
209, 234 (1977).
233 See discussion supra Section II.A.
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discrimination.234 Here too, the statutory floor does allow for some
private employees to be discharged or disciplined due to their
political speech, and for some employers to take what would be
otherwise prohibited action. This is a conflict of rights that is
inevitable given the complexities of the rights at stake. By
allowing exemptions for smaller businesses, the statute
safeguards certain private entities against substantial
impairment to the value of their businesses and substantial
interference to their associational rights. Furthermore, the
statutory floor also addresses the attribution problem, since the
smaller the business, the more likely the speech of employees will
be attributed to the employer.
In the interest of further safeguarding against the
substantial impairment to the value of businesses, to which even
larger businesses are susceptible, the statute would also provide
a substantial injury defense to employers.235 The defense would
allow employers to claim that the employee’s political speech “(a)
substantially injured the employer’s ability to produce his goods
or services, or (b) caused the loss of a substantial amount of
business from customers or suppliers, or (c) created a reasonable
likelihood of the immediate occurrence of the events specified in
the sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section.”236 If the employer
proves “any . . . of these defenses by a preponderance of the
evidence,” then the employer is released of liability and the
adverse employment action is justified.237 While it would likely
be difficult for a tech giant like Google238 to meet the
requirements of the substantial injury defense, it might be
reasonable for a restaurant chain like Top Dog to assert this
defense, especially given the social media traction and publicity
of their employees’ speech.239 Ultimately, the statute’s exceptions
and defenses serve to avoid any constitutional problems that
could arise from placing too heavy a burden on the employer.
D.

Proposed Legislation

This note proposes that Congress pass a federal statute,
aimed at protecting private employees from being harmed because
of their political beliefs and activities. The legislation should be

234
235
236
237
238
239

Walsh, supra note 231, at 606.
Carroll, supra note 9, at 78–79.
Id. at 78–79.
Id. at 79.
Manjoo, supra note 213.
Wilkinson & Parry, supra note 1.

220

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1

titled “The Statutory Protection of Every Employee from
Constitutional Harm (SPEECH) Act,” and will read as follows:
The Statutory Protection of Every Employee from
Constitutional Harm (SPEECH) Act
SECTION 1. PREVENTING ADVERSE ACTION AGAINST EMPLOYEES
DUE TO THEIR POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
In the interest of employment uniformity, interstate
commerce, and industrial peace, no employer shall . . .
(a)
make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy
forbidding or preventing employees from engaging or participating
in politics or from becoming candidates for public office,
(b)
adopt or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy
which will control or direct the political activities or affiliations
of employees,
(c)
or coerce or influence, or attempt to coerce or
influence employees through or by means of threat or discharge
to adopt or follow or refrain from adopting or following any
particular course or line of political action or political activity.
SECTION 2. DEFINING “POLITICAL ACTIVITIES”
“Political activities” in Section 1 shall include . . .
(a)
speech that involves employees’ political views,
expressions, affiliations, or activities,
(b)
the espousal of a candidate or cause,
(c)
or any speech having to do with issues, ideas,
arguments, ideologies, or positions that deal with broad social policy
choices, the organization, conduct, and powers of government, and
similar matters of concern to the general public.
SECTION 3. CIVIL ACTION AGAINST EMPLOYERS
The employee can recover actual damages and, if he or
she has been dismissed, can additionally seek to receive either
punitive damages or reinstatement.
SECTION 4. EMPLOYER EXCEPTIONS AND DEFENSES
Nothing in Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this statute shall apply
to employers
(a)
who employ less than [a prescribed number of]
employees [to be determined by Congress],
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(b)
whose business’s gross income is less than [a
prescribed dollar amount, to be determined by Congress],
(c)
whose business otherwise indicates an intimately
connected workplace, such that an employer proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that his or her associational
interests would be unreasonably impaired by the employment of
an individual with such political views,
(d)
whose business has been or will be substantially
injured by the employee’s political speech, such that the
employer proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employee has caused or that there is a reasonable likelihood that
the employee will cause a loss of a substantial amount of
business from customers or suppliers,
(e)
whose business is a representative, political, or
ideological organization, in which the employee holds a
representative role, and whose speech, if attributed to the
business, would directly threaten the business’s dissemination
of an ideological message,240
(f)
who wish to take action against their business’s
highest-level managers, or an otherwise restricted subset of
employees hired with the express purpose of representing their
employer’s political positions.241
SECTION 5. CRIMINALLY IMPERMISSIBLE SPEECH
Notwithstanding the above sections, employers may still
choose to inquire into and take action against employees based on
speech that is found to be criminally or otherwise impermissible.
*

*

*

Providing for exceptions that factor in employer
interests, and leaving certain technical figures to Congress’s
discretion, the SPEECH Act offers a balanced approach to
protecting private employees’ freedom of political speech in a
meaningful and necessary way.
CONCLUSION
“Indeed, unpopular speech is the type most in need of
protection.”242 Even when the political speech is contrary to
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commonly held ideological views, the benefits of protecting private
employees’ speech is in the best interest of both self-expression and
American ideals of a participatory democracy. Although this note
ultimately recognizes the need for federal protection, the
arguments against this protection are not without merit and
constitute compelling reasons to insert some balancing of interests
into a statutory proposal. While James Damore’s former employer
might be subject to liability under current California law, the result
might be different in a state without such employee speech
protections, one that adheres to the doctrine of at-will employment
even in cases of political discrimination. Many of the private
employee attendees of the Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville,
Virginia, for example, may be fired simply because of their political
activity outside of work. The modern examples of particularly
contentious political speech by private employees, and the possible
remedies and consequences of their employers’ actions, highlight
the need for a comprehensive, uniform statute protecting
employees’ political speech.
It is clear that the current system of political speech
protections for private employees falls short of what is necessary to
consistently protect the modern employee. As individuals
experience the everyday realities of the “war on free speech,”243
there is a greater need on the part of the government to step in and
uplift political speech protections on the federal level. By doing so,
the government would promote and strengthen free speech, and
dismiss the idea that the type or amount of political speech private
employees partake in while off-duty is conditioned on the approval
of their employers. It is time to end the war on free speech in the
workplace and protect American democracy.
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